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UNTIL  FAIRLY  RECENTLY,  THE  STANDARD  THEORY  concerning  inter- 
national financial capital flows-movements  of nondirect investment items 
in the capital account-related  capitalfiows to levels of interest  differentials. 
According to this "flow theory," an increase in foreign short-term interest 
rates would increase the outflow of capital from the United States, and as 
long  as foreign interest rates remained higher than American rates, the 
flow would continue. Conversely, one way for the United States to improve 
its balance on capital account would be to raise its rates, and as long as 
U.S.  rates remained higher than foreign rates, the capital account would 
show a reduced deficit. 
This relationship of capital flows to levels of interest rates was rather 
widely  accepted in  the  mid-1960s by  both  theorists and  empiricists in 
international economics. For example, the famous articles by Robert A. 
Mundell on the simultaneous maintenance of external and internal balance 
generally assumed the relationship: ". . . at high rates of interest the net 
inflow of capital will be larger, or the net outflow will be smaller, than at 
low rates of interest."' In a well-known study, Peter B. Kenen also cor- 
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related capital  flows with levels of interest differentials and set forth some 
evidence of interest sensitivity.2 
The implicit model relating capital flows to interest rate levels may also 
have been part of the reasoning behind "Operation Twist"-the  attempt 
to  boost  short-term rates to  improve the capital account while keeping 
long-term rates down  to  encourage domestic investment spending and, 
indirectly, economic growth. Similarly, the interest equalization tax (IET), 
which reduced net returns on U.S.  holdings of longer-term foreign assets 
relative to those on U.S.  assets-the  equivalent of a drop in foreign rates 
relative to  U.S.  rates-was  generally expected to  promote improvement 
in the capital account as long as it was in effect. 
The implications of this view for the monetary-fiscal policy mix were 
fairly clear: To  improve the  balance of  payments while maintaining a 
given path of domestic demand and employment, the prescription would 
be to  tighten up on monetary policy, thus raising interest rates, and at 
the same time to ease fiscal policy. Maintenance of a given level of demand 
would hold the trade and current account balances more or less unchanged, 
and higher interest rates would reduce the outflow of capital. 
Capital  Theory  and  International  Capital  Flows 
This flow theory of international financial capital movements coexisted 
with seemingly contradictory, but also widely accepted, theories of real 
investment demand and portfolio distribution. A leading theory of invest- 
ment demand is derived from the proposition that the desired or equilib- 
rium capital stock is related to the level of the interest rate-or,  more pre- 
cisely, the user cost  of  owned capital goods-and  expected output.3 On 
this view of investment behavior, it is changes in interest rates, other things 
equal,;  that cause changes in the desired stock of capital. These generate 
2. Peter B. Kenen, "Short-term  Capital Movements and the U.S. Balance of Pay- 
ments,"  in The United  States Balance  of Payments,  Hearings  before the Joint Economic 
Committee,  88 Cong. 1 sess. (1963), pp. 153-91. 
3. For an exposition  of this view,  see Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Capital  Theory  and Invest- 
ment Behavior,"  in American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings  of the 
Seventy-fifth  Annual  Meeting,  1962  (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 53, May 1963),  pp. 
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laborators.  Charles  W. Bischoff  also bases his work on essentially  the same theoretical 
model, but uses a less restrictive  empirical  specification  than Jorgenson's.  See his "The 
Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions,"  in Gary Fromm (ed.), Tax Incentives  and 
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the investment flows analogous to international capital flows, which are, 
after all, simply changes in asset and liability positions. 
More relevant to the question of international financial capital flows is 
the model of portfolio distribution developed by Markowitz and Tobin.4 
Their theory makes the distribution of assets depend on the rates of return 
and estimates of risk for the alternative assets. For any given set of interest 
rates and risk estimates, there will be an equilibrium distribution of assets 
in  a portfolio  (among  domestic  and foreign assets, for  example);  it  is 
changes  in interest rates that lead to changes in this allocation, orflows of 
capital, given the size of the portfolio. Applied to international financial 
capital, this theory implies that, at any given point in time, raising domestic 
interest rates will produce a one-shot stock-adjustment inflow of capital 
as  portfolios  are redistributed. This  redistribution may,  of  course,  be 
spread over  several periods.  But  once  a  new  portfolio  equilibrium is 
reached, the flow will cease. This view was put succinctly by Tinbergen in 
1956: 
Both debt management and discount policy can indeed attract a  certain 
amount of  capital from abroad, corresponding  with  the  interest offered. 
When demand for assets reaches  its equilibrium  at the new interest  rate, no 
further  inflow of foreign investment  will, however,  occur unless  a further  rise 
in rates  is effectuated.5 
On this view, it is rising, not high, interest rates that cause a continuing 
capital inflow (or reduced outflow).' 
INTRODUCTION  OF  THE  " NEW  VIEW 
Since the mid-1960s, a number of investigators have attempted to bring 
the theory of international capital flows into line with the theories of capi- 
tal accumulation and portfolio distribution just described. In general, this 
4. Harry M. Markowitz,  Portfolio  Selection: Efficient  Diversification  of Investments 
(John Wiley & Sons, 1959); James Tobin, "Liquidity  Preference  as Behavior  Towards 
Risk," Review  of Economic  Studies,  Vol. 25 (February  1958),  pp. 65-86; and "The  Theory 
of Portfolio  Selection,"  in F. Hahn and F. P. R. Brechling  (eds.), The  Theory  of Interest 
Rates (Macmillan,  1965). 
5. Jan Tinbergen, Economic  Policy: Principles and Design (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland Publishing  Co., 1964),  p. 111. 
6. This point was also recognized  in the early  sixties  by Tobin  and Johnson.  See James 
Tobin, "Economic  Progress  and the International  Monetary  System,"  Proceedings  of the 
Academy  of Political Science, Vol. 27 (May 1963), p. 84; and Harry G. Johnson, "To- 
wards  a General  Theory  of the Balance  of Payments,"  in Richard  E. Caves  and Harry  G. 
Johnson, Selection Committee for the American Economic Association, Readings  in 
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"new view" of international capital movements makes the fraction of total 
assets held abroad a function of the level of interest rates and estimates of 
risk both at home and abroad.7  For certain kinds of assets, such as short- 
term claims on foreigners, other variables, such as exports, are added to 
the list of explanatory variables. 
In this view, the stock of  assets held abroad depends on the level of 
interest rates, the stock of total  assets, and the levels of other variables, 
such as exports. An increase in U.S.  interest rates will then cause a shift 
in the stock of assets toward the United States-the  "stock-shift effect"- 
and, assuming a continuing growth in total assets, a reallocation of mar- 
ginal additions to total assets towards the United States-the  "continuing 
flow effect." There is a presumption, discussed below, that the flow effect 
is small relative to the stock effect. 
With stock-shift effects large compared with flow effects, the changes in 
capital movements that policy makers perceive shortly after changes in 
the  stance  of  monetary  policy-or  in  money  and credit conditions  in 
general-are  likely to  be temporary. To  a large extent, it is rising, not 
high,  interest rates that  induce permanent improvement in  the  capital 
account. As Tobin put it, "A country cannot expect to cover a basic deficit 
on  current or  long-term  investment  account  indefinitely by  attracting 
short-term money,  unless it is prepared to jack  its interest rates higher 
and higher."  8 
The implication of the new view, then, is that policy steps like the inter- 
est equalization tax and "Operation Twist"-to  the extent it actually was 
7. Initial contributions  to this literature  include William  H. Branson,  Financial  Cap- 
ital Flows in the U.S. Balance of Payments (Amsterdam:  North-Holland  Publishing  Co., 
1968); Thomas D. Willett, "A Portfolio Theory of International  Short-Term  Capital 
Movements"  (Ph.D. thesis, University  of Virginia, 1967); and Thomas D. Willett and 
Francesco Forte, "Interest  Rate Policy and External Balance," Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  Vol. 83 (May 1969), pp. 242-62. More recent contributions  include R. C. 
Bryant and Patric H. Hendershott,  Financial Capital Flows in the Balance of Payments of 
the  United States:  An Exploratory Empirical Study,  Princeton  Studies  in International 
Finance,  No. 25 (Princeton  University,  Department  of Economics,  International  Finance 
Section, 1970); Norman C. Miller and Marina v. N.  Whitman, "A Mean-Variance 
Analysis of United States Long-Term  Portfolio Foreign  Investment,"  Quarterly  Jolurnal 
of Economics,  Vol. 84 (May 1970),  pp. 175-96; C. H. Lee, "A Stock-Adjustment  Analysis 
of Capital  Movements:  The United  States-Canadian  Case,"  Journal  ofPolitical  Economy, 
Vol. 77 (July-August 1969), pp. 512-23; and John E. Floyd, "International  Capital 
Movements  and Monetary  Equilibrium,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 59 (Septem- 
ber 1969),  pp. 472-92. 
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successful in "twisting"-stimulate  an essentially one-time improvement 
in  the capital account. Although  there is  a continuing-flow effect, it is 
probably small relative both to the initial stock effect and to subsequent 
stock shifts stemming from later changes in interest rates. In other words, 
the continuing-flow effects could tend to be swamped in the data by later 
stock shifts. On the other hand, the outflow following an easing of mone- 
tary policy will also be largely temporary and can be handled by official 
financing or use of reserves, rather than by retreating from a policy pre- 
sumably designed to meet domestic needs. 
This, then, in fairly general terms, is the new stock-adjustment view of 
international capital movements and its main implication for policy. The 
next section describes more precisely the relationship between the stock- 
shift and continuing-flow effects of a given change in interest rates. 
There follows a brief summary of some results of the empirical applica- 
tion of the stock-adjustment model to the data on U.S.  financial capital 
flows. This application yields some rough estimates of the sensitivities of 
U.S.  capital movements to  changes in credit conditions, represented by 
changes  in  interest rates, the  income  velocity  of  money,  and  a  credit 
rationing measure devised by Jaffee and Modigliani.9 
The last two sections set out the implications of the analysis for domes- 
tic  monetary policy,  both  in  general and in  terms of  the  outlook  for 
1970-71, and conclude with a few observations on the implications of the 
new  view for monetary independence and proposals for reform of  the 
international exchange rate system. 
The Stock Equilibrium  Model of Capital Movements 
The portfolio distribution approach to the explanation of capital flows 
relates equilibrium stocks of  assets to  levels of rates of return and risk. 
For any given set of foreign and domestic interest rates and risk evalua- 
tions, there will be a given distribution of an individual's assets. Holdings 
of any asset-in  particular, claims on foreigners Cf-will  change as total 
assets or interest rates change. The discussion here focuses first on the 
stock and flow results of an interest rate change, and then on a few prob- 
lems of empirical application of this model to the data. 
9. Dwight M. Jaffee  and Franco Modigliani,  "A Theory  and Test of Credit  Ration- 
ing," American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 59 (December  1969),  pp. 850-72, esp. pp. 865-67. 240  William H. Branson 
INTEREST  RATE  CHANGES:  STOCK  AND  FLOW  EFFECTS 
Suppose the distribution of  assets-or  total  wealth  W-is  a function 
only of  interest rates and risk estimates, and thus does not  depend on 
total  wealth  itself.  A  simple  linear portfolio  distribution function  can 
then be written as 
(1)  C'  =  W(ao +  alid  +  a2if + a3R), 
where 
Cf =  claims on foreigners, or assets held abroad, 
W =  total assets, 
id =  domestic interest rates, 
if  =  foreign interest rates (the last two may be viewed as summarizing 
the entire term structure), 
R =  a set of risk evaluations (lumped together only because the focus 
of this paper is on the effects of interest rate changes).10 
Here Cf/W  depends only on interest rates and estimates of risk. This is 
probably the  form  of  the  portfolio  distribution equation  most  widely 
used in empirical investigations of the financial sector, and it is generally 
accepted as a "maintained hypothesis" in recent work on  international 
capital movements." 
The rate of change of  Cf per period t, with interest rates and R constant 
and total assets growing, is given by 
(2)  -  =  W(ao +  alid  +  a2if +  a3R), 
where C1 is defined as dCf/dt. What then is the effect of an interest rate 
change on the stock Cf at an initial level of W, and on the flow of capital 
&  as W grows? 
From equation (1), the effect of an increase in the domestic interest rate 
Aid  is given by 
Stock effect =  ACf -  Wa,Aid. 
10. The equation is stated as a linear form only for ease of exposition. The results 
would be exactly  the same if it were  stated more generally  as Cf -  W[f(id, if, R)]. 
11. See, for instance, William  C. Brainard  and James Tobin, "Pitfalls  in Financial 
Model Building,"  in American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings  of the 
Eightieth  Annual  Meeting,  1967  (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 58, May 1968),  p. 101; 
and  E.  E.  Leamer  and  R.  M.  Stern,  Quantitative International Economics  (Allyn  and 
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The effect on the flow generated by growth in total assets is obtained from 
equation (2), 
Flow effect =  - =WalAid. 
Thus in this fairly general, and widely used, form of the portfolio distri- 
bution model, the ratio between the continuing-flow effect and the stock- 
shift effect of an interest rate change is given by 
Flow effect _fa4Aid  W 
Stock effect  Waliid =  =-growth  rate of W. 
If total assets W are growing at 10 percent per year, then the annual flow 
effect of  a change in interest rates will be  10 percent of the stock-shift 
effect. 
But what if the Cf/W  ratio has a positive time trend due, perhaps, to 
increasing awareness of U.S.  investors of investment possibilities abroad? 
Won't this raise the flow effect relative to the stock effect? The answer is a 
qualified "No." If the time trend does not reflect increasing interest sensi- 
tivity, but rather changing tastes among assets, changing risk evaluations, 
or increasing knowledge of opportunities, then the flow-stock relationship 
is not affected. This can be seen by adding a time trend to the expression 
in parentheses in equation (1).12  The trend in this case does not change the 
relationship between the flow and stock effects of an interest rate change; 
the ratio remains equal to the growth rate of total assets. 
But if there is an upward trend in interest sensitivity, then the relative 
magnitudes of the flow and stock effects would be changed. The change 
would work in the direction of increasing U.S. capital outflows on average, 
however, only if foreign rates were rising relative to U.S. rates. Since that 
was not the way relative interest rates generally moved in the 1960s, an 
increase in the international interest sensitivity of liquid funds would have 
meant an augmented flow of funds into, not out of, the United States."3 
12. This gives Cf  =  W(ao +  alid  +  a2if  +  a8R  +  a4t), with a stock-shift effect of 
ACf  =  WalAid,  and  ef  =  W(ao +  alid  +  a2if  +  a3R +  a4t) +  a4W,  so  that  the  flow 
effect is still ACf =  WalAid, and the ratio is still  WI W. 
13. Implementation  of a model with a trend  in interest  sensitivity  would involve add- 
ing terms  in idt and if  t to equation  (1). In empirical  work  to date, there  is no evidence  that 
this improves  the explanation  of capital  flows. Splitting  the data into 1960-64  and 1965- 
69 samples, for example, does not assign higher  coefficients  to interest  rate changes  in 
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Thus as a working hypothesis, subject to testing for increasing interest 
sensitivity, the flow-stock relationship of equation (3) can be adopted. 
PROBLEMS  OF  EMPIRICAL  APPLICATION 
The principal empirical implication of the flow-stock relationship de- 
rived above is that it will be hard to detect continuing-flow effects in aggre- 
gate data that come from a world of continually changing interest rates. 
With frequent changes in  interest rates and the  other determinants of 
equilibrium holdings of portfolio assets, the stock-shift effects will prob- 
ably tend to overwhelm the flow effects in the data. This means that the 
existence of the continuing-flow effects will be hard to verify empirically, 
and will probably have to  be built into the estimates by the use of  an 
equation like (1). 
Application of the portfolio model to the data requires numerous modi- 
fications. First, the existence of complications like transaction costs and 
tax laws means that adjustment to changes in interest rates will be lagged 
and incomplete.  Since redistribution of  existing portfolios  may  impose 
extra transaction costs, the redistribution may be accomplished by reallo- 
cating additions to the portfolio and leaving the existing stock unchanged. 
Such a process can spread the stock-shift effect over several quarters. If 
empirical work does not take this lag into account, it may appear to detect 
a relation between interest rate levels and capitalflows. 
Furthermore, variables other than  interest rates affect the  measured 
flows. The next section takes account of the effect exports have on short- 
term claims on foreigners through trade finance. A measure of the velocity 
of money and the Jaffee-Modigliani  credit rationing index will be included 
to reflect availability effects that are not perfectly correlated with interest 
rates. Some alloWance  must also be made for the effect of the balance-of- 
payments programs and the interest equalization tax on U.S. flows. 
Risk estimates, which enter the theoretical model of capital flows, are 
hard to specify empirically, and will be left out of the empirical estimates. 
This omission would seem on initial consideration to be particularly  serious 
in the case of international capital movements. But that is basically an 
empirical question: If shifts in risk estimates in fact cause major move- 
ments of any category of capital, they should be reflected in large errors 
in an equation that omits such considerations. In addition, changes in risk 
estimates may cause only a reallocation of assets held abroad: If a foreign 
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causes U.S.  investors to switch from French to German investments, this 
will not affect the total of U.S. claims on foreigners. 
Even with all of these empirical difficulties, fairly regular relationships 
can be found between capital flows and the key determinants identified 
above-interest  rates, money velocities, and total assets. The next section 
reports briefly some  results  of  the  application  of  the  portfolio  stock- 
adjustment theory to the determination of changes in U.S. claims on pri- 
vate foreigners. These claims are divided into three categories that exhaust 
the asset side of the capital account, with the exception of direct invest- 
ment. This discussion will provide an idea of the expected magnitude of 
the stock and flow effects of changes in interest rates and velocity. The 
estimates are then used in  discussing the  probable effects of  monetary 
policy  on  the  assets side of  the U.S.  capital account in  1970-71.  I  am 
currently working on the estimation of equations on the liability side, but 
the results are not ready to be reported. Flows  of foreign-owned capital 
would move in the same direction as U.S.  capital in response to changes 
in monetary conditions, so they would  add to  the effects of  alternative 
monetary policies reported in Table 2. 
The Explanation of U.S.  Capital Flows 
The results reported here come  from the  application to  the  1960-69 
quarterly data of an equation that is essentially a first-differenced  form of 
equation (1). I will seek to explain changes in U.S. holdings of three cate- 
gories of foreign assets: (1) short-term private claims /C8;  (2) long-term 
nondirect, nonbanking claims LC'., here called "portfolio claims"; and 
(3) long-term banking claims AB. 
Short-term (less than one year) private claims include short-term bank 
loans  and acceptances extended to  foreigners; trade credit extended by 
U.S. firms to foreigners; short-term foreign securities held by Americans; 
and deposits of Americans in foreign banks, including holdings of Euro- 
dollars by Americans. Portfolio claims consist of foreign stocks and bonds 
held  by  Americans,  excluding  equities  representing direct  investment 
abroad, while long-term banking claims are term loans to foreigners. 
In general, I have used U.S.  and various foreign short- and long-term 
interest rates and income velocities of money v as measures of U.S. credit 
conditions. I have also experimented with the Jaffee-Modigliani index cr 
as an explicit measure of U.S.  credit rationing. If U.S.  credit conditions 
tighten either because there is an exogenous increase in credit demand with 244  William H. Branson 
given supply conditions, or because growth of the money supply is slowed 
in order to retard growth in GNP, the whole set of indicators of monetary 
tightness-interest  rates, velocity, and credit rationing-would  be expected 
to rise. The velocity and credit rationing variables should represent move- 
ments in the domestic opportunity cost  of foreign lending to  the extent 
that changes in credit conditions are not fully reflected in changes in inter- 
est rates. In addition, these variables may reflect a tendency of U.S. lend- 
ers to  put foreign borrowers near the end  of  the credit rationing line. 
These indicators need not be perfectly correlated with one another, so I 
have experimented with all three measures in each equation. In the equa- 
tions for U.S. capital flows, all three variables play a significant role. 
The  general form  of  the  equations  to  be  estimated for  U.S.  capital 
flows-changes  in U.S. claims on foreigners-is 
(4)  ALCf  =  aO  +  a4A  W +  a2A (WiUS)  +  a3A (WvUS) 
+  a4zA(Wcr) +  a5A(Wif)  +  a6A(Wvf),14 
where 
ACf =  change in U.S.  claims on foreigners, not seasonally adjusted, in 
millions of dollars at quarterly rates, 
W =  wealth, measured by household net worth in trillions of dollars 
in the equation for AC8 and AC1, and by total bank assets in 
billions of dollars in the equation for AB, 
i =  the appropriate short- and long-term interest rates, in percentage 
points, 
v =  income velocity of money, defined as the ratio of GNP (seasonally 
adjusted annual rate) to  M1 (the sum of  demand deposits and 
currency, seasonally adjusted), 
cr =  Jaffee-Modigliani credit rationing measure, base period =  1.0. 
The superscripts CAN, SW, and UK denote the interest rate and velocity 
variables of Canada, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, respectively, 
while ED  denotes the Eurodollar rate. Subscripts s  and I denote short- 
and long-term securities, respectively. 
14. Equation  (4) can be obtained  from (1) by adding  terms  in cr and v, dropping  the 
unobserved  R, multiplying  through by W the terms in parentheses  (including  v), and 
finally  taking  first  differences.  No adjustment  has been made  here  for a possible  trend  in 
v, which  would  be very  difficult  to estimate  in the 1960-69  data.  Reducing  the Av  series  to 
allow for a constant trend would simply reduce all the A(Wv)  terms proportionately, 
leaving the coefficients  of these terms unchanged,  with the net effect showing  up in the 
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Each term on the right-hand side of equation (4) potentially represents 
a weighted sum of its current and lagged values. In general, lag lengths 
were extended until the coefficients of the furthest lagged values became 
insignificant. This procedure was followed to  allow for the possibility of 
an extended lag in the stock-shift adjustment of financial capital to changes 
in monetary conditions. As will be seen shortly, lag lengths generally do 
not exceed three or four quarters, suggesting that the stock adjustment is 
generally completed within a year after a change in monetary conditions. 
The equations for short- and long-term portfolio claims were estimated 
including three seasonal dummies, while no seasonal variation was found 
in the equation for long-term banking claims. The coefficients of the sea- 
sonal dummies are reported and discussed in Appendix A. 
SHORT-TERM  CLAIMS 
Several modifications of the basic equation (4) must be made in order 
to  apply it  to  changes in U.S.  short-term claims on  private foreigners 
AC8. First, it is necessary to  recognize that a large proportion of  U.S. 
short-term lending is related to trade credit. To take account of this factor, 
I have added terms involving current and lagged changes in merchandise 
exports X. Exports are measured in millions of dollars, at quarterly rates, 
not seasonally adjusted.'5  A given stock of trade credit will finance a given 
flow of trade, so that it is levels of exports that are related to  stocks of 
assets, and it is changes in exports that generate capital flows. 
Thus if the flow of exports increases from one level to another, the effect 
on the balance of payments will be partially offset by a stock-shift increase 
in trade credit. After this stock shift is completed, the increase in exports 
becomes a clear gain to the balance of payments. 
The second modification is the addition of variables to account for the 
existence of the voluntary foreign credit restraint program (VFCR)  ini- 
tiated by the U.S.  government in February 1965. In general, the program 
initially required banks to  limit their increase in short-term claims to  5 
15. In theory,  the effect  of changes  in exports  on claims on foreigners  should depend 
on interest  rates i at home and abroad,  just as would the effect of an increase  in total 
assets W.  Thus, in the equation  for short-term  claims,  cross-product  terms  in X and i, as 
well as in W  and i, should ideally  be included  in the equation  explaining  AC8.  With only 
forty quarterly  observations,  this would add too many variables  to the regression  equa- 
tions. After experiments  with the alternative  use of W  and X as the basic scale variable, 
it was clear that W was statistically  superior,  so terms in X were simply added to the 
AC' equation,  as stated in the text. 246  William H. Branson 
percent in 1965 and 4 percent in 1966, leaving the ceiling at the end of 1966 
at 109 percent of claims outstanding at the end of 1964. During this period, 
short-term  outflows were reduced substantially (becoming negative in some 
quarters) so that outstanding claims were well below the ceiling at the end 
of 1966. With this leeway in mind, the ceiling on outstanding claims was 
held constant at 109 percent of the 1964 level in 1967, and it was both re- 
duced to  103 percent and made mandatory in 1968. 
In an earlier paper, Willett and I suggested that in 1965 the banks made 
a downward adjustment in their stock of claims on foreigners to get suffi- 
ciently below the ceiling to conduct business more or less normally there- 
after.'6 It was this leeway that troubled the administration in  1967 and 
1968. 
Given this description of events, two dummy variables can be added to 
the equation explaining AC8 to  reflect the reactions to  the programs as 
interpreted above. The first dummy variable, DStockl,  is set at unity in 
1965:1-1965:3,  and zero for other periods. This should yield an estimate 
of the initial stock-shift effect as the banks got below their ceilings. The 
second dummy, DFlowl,  is set at zero through 1965:3, and unity there- 
after. This should yield an estimate of the continuing effect of the program 
on the outflow of U.S. private short-term capital. Finally, the equation for 
AC8  was estimated using a number of foreign interest rates, including the 
Eurodollar rate, and foreign velocities. Only the British interest rate proved 
to be significant. In addition, it turned out that the credit rationing index 
cr plays no role in the equation for AC8.  The "final" equation for AC8  is: 
(5)  ACt  =8-211.1  +  3582.4AWt  +  0.18AXt +  0.39AXt-, 
(5.48)  (2.22)  (1.90)  (3.91) 
-  113.2A(Wi1s)t-2  -  454.9A(Wvus)t  +  48.7A(WiYK  )t 
(3.05)  (1.05)  (2.46) 
+  34.7A(WiYK)tl  -  573.1 DStockl  -  134.2 DFlowl. 
(1.70)  (5.26)  (2.06) 
R2 = 0.83, standard  error =  151.7, Durbin-Watson  = 2.05. 
The numbers in parentheses beneath coefficients here and in subsequent 
empirical equations are t statistics. 
16. William H. Branson and Thomas D. Willett, "Policy Toward Short-term  Cap- 
ital Movements: Some Implications of  the Portfolio Approach," presented at  the 
Universities-National  Bureau of  Economic Research Conference on  International 
Mobility and Movement  of Capital,  Brookings  Institution,  Jan. 30-Feb. 1, 1970,  publi- 
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The equation uses quarterly data for  1960-68.  However,  1963:3 was 
omitted from the sample period because it had an unusually large residual, 
presumably reflecting the  shift into  short-term assets when the interest 
equalization tax was imposed on long-term capital. Furthermore, the 1969 
data were excluded because the dock strike that began in December 1968 
temporarily upset the relationship between claims and exports. If AX is 
smoothed for the period 1968:4-1969:3,  the equation including 1969 is not 
significantly  different  from (5). The inclusion of the 1969 data substantially 
increases the significance of the U.S. velocity term, changing its coefficient 
to -999.7,  and its t ratio to 2.33. The importance of the velocity term in the 
most recent data suggested that it be retained in (5). Details on the estima- 
tion of the several versions of (5) are set out in Appendix A. 
It should be noted that the longest lag length in equation (5) is two 
quarters. This  indicates that the  stock-shift effect on  short-term claims 
will be completed within three quarters after a change in interest rates. 
LONG-TERM  PORTFOLIO  CLAIMS 
Two minor modifications of the basic capital flow equation (4) must be 
made to  apply it to flows of U.S.  long-term portfolio capital AC', which 
is residually defined as changes in U.S.  claims on foreigners exclusive of 
direct investment, short-term claims, and long-term banking claims. The 
first modification is the inclusion of an adjustment for the interest equali- 
zation tax, which was imposed on U.S.  purchases of  foreign long-term 
portfolio assets in July of  1963. Canadian issues were exempted. The tax 
essentially reduces the return on foreign portfolio assets by imposing an ad- 
ditional cost on their purchase. Ideally, to take account of the tax, the rele- 
vant foreign long-term interest rates should be adjusted downward to the 
effective rates of return net of the tax. But since the Canadian long-term 
interest rate is the only foreign long-term rate in the equation for long- 
term portfolio claims, I have used a dummy for the tax, IET, that is set at 
unity in 1963:3-1963:4  and zero otherwise."7 
The second modification is the inclusion of the Eurodollar rate in the 
equation to  reflect credit conditions in Europe. The Eurodollar rate iED 
was included in the first estimated version of  all the asset equations in 
order to  test  generally for  sensitivity of  U.S.  capital flows to  pressures 
17. This treatment  incorrectly  implies  that the tax has no continuing-flow  effect.  This 
flaw would be corrected  if the IET were entered  as an adjustment  to foreign long-term 
rates; I am continuing  to experiment  with this more refined  approach. 248  William H. Branson 
from the Eurodollar market. The rate is highly significant in the equation 
for long-term portfolio capital. 
The equation for AC' was estimated using a number of foreign long- 
term interest rates and velocity measures, as reported in Appendix A. 
None  of the velocity measures was significant, and of the foreign long- 
term rates, only the Canadian rate iCNA  had a t ratio greater than unity. 
The Canadian long-term rate was retained in the final equation because 
more than half of U.S.  long-term portfolio capital flows have been bilat- 
eral with Canada since the interest equalization tax was imposed. 
The "final" estimated equation for AC' is: 
(6)  ACt =  84.2 +  4686.7A  Wt  -  597.7A(  WvUs)t  -  47.6A(Wcr)t 
(5.22)  (3.35)  (1.83)  (2.04) 
+  50.9A(  WiED)t +  31.7A(WiED)t_1 
(2.76)  (1.79) 
+  46.7A(WiiCAN)t  -428.9  IET. 
(1.10)  (4.84) 
R2  =  0.69,  standard error =  116.9, Durbin-Watson  =  1.49. 
The equation is estimated on the forty quarterly  observations from 1960: 1 
through 1969:4. The U.S. velocity measure and credit rationing index both 
play a fairly significant, and surprisingly independent, role in explaining 
U.S.  portfolio  capital flows.  When either variable is dropped from the 
equation, the coefficient of the other does not change much. It is surprising 
that the U.S.  long-term bond rate does not  enter the equation.  It was 
thoroughly insignificant in all trials; presumably it is dominated by move- 
ments in U.S.  velocity and credit rationing, and in the Canadian long- 
term bond rate, which is fairly highly correlated with the U.S.  rate. The 
longest lag length in equation (6) is one quarter, which suggests that stock 
adjustment  of  portfolio  claims  to  changes  in  monetary  conditions  is 
particularly rapid. 
LONG-TERM  BANKING  CLAIMS 
To complete the set of equations explaining U.S. financial capital flows, 
I have estimated a number of equations for changes in long-term banking 
claims on foreigners AB. These are by far the least stable of the equations 
on the asset side of the capital account, and the equation is presented here 
.only because the U.S.  velocity measure plays a highly significant role in 
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From  1960 to the third quarter of 1963, quarterly movements of long- 
term banking claims fluctuated in a band between an inflow of $50 million 
and an outflow of $150 million. In the fourth quarter of 1963, apparently 
in reaction to the interest equalization tax, the outflow shot up to nearly 
$500 million,  as foreign borrowers seemed to  change sources of  funds. 
The outflow subsided to  $75 million in  1964:2, but it rose steadily to  a 
peak of $460 million in 1965:1, apparently  in anticipation of the voluntary 
restraint program, which was initiated in February 1965. The flow then 
moved to an inflow of $200 million in 1965:2, as the banks reduced claims 
on foreigners  to get under their VFCR ceilings. Then, from 1965:3 through 
1969, the movement fluctuated roughly between an inflow of $150 million 
and an outflow of $50 million, significantly below the normal outflow of 
the period before the IET and VFCR. 
To account for these extremely large movements from 1963:4 to 1965:2, 
I have used three dummy variables. The first, IET3, is a dummy set at unity 
in 1963:4 and zero otherwise; it essentially eliminates that observation and 
gives us a measure of the IET effect on the change in long-term banking 
claims on  foreigners. The  second,  DA3, takes on the values of unity in 
1964:4-1965:1  and zero otherwise to account for the outflow in anticipa- 
tion  of  the  voluntary restraint program. The  third, DFlow3, is  a flow 
dummy that takes on the value of unity from 1965: 1 on,  and zero previ- 
ously. This shifts the estimated outflow down from the higher range of the 
period before late 1963 to the lower range of the period after early 1965. 
The scale variable in the equation for long-term banking claims is total 
bank assets A, in billions of dollars, taken from the Federal Reserve data 
on the flow of funds. The equation was estimated using a number of for- 
eign interest rates and velocity measures, as well as the U.S.  long-term 
rate, velocity, and credit rationing measure. Several European long-term 
rates and the Eurodollar rate were tested as measures of credit conditions 
in Europe, relevant to the flow of long-term banking claims. The "final" 
equation for AB is: 
(7)  ABt =  89.7 +  6.91  AA  t +  0.3  8A(A  iuK)t_-  +  0.66A(Aisw)t_ 
(1.83)  (1.55)  (1.78)  (1.64) 
5 
-  wA(AvUs)t_ +  418.4IET3 +  364.4DA3 -  93.4DFlow3. 
(4.31)  (5.08)  (1.89) 
RI = 0.74, standard  error = 93.6, Durbin-Watson  = 2.29. 250  William H. Branson 
Equation (7) is estimated on the forty quarterly observations from 1960 
through  1969. Seasonal dummies were not  included in the estimate be- 
cause no seasonal pattern on AB was discernible. Aside from the dummies, 
the  only really significant variable in (7) is the U.S.  velocity term. The 
coefficients of the A(AvUs)ti terms are as follows: 
Lag lengths  (quarters)  1  2  3  4  5 
Coefficient  -0.92  -1.33  -1.31  -0.87  0 
(1.09)  (2.52)  (2.05)  (1.71) 
The sum of the A(AvUs)t_ coefficients is -4.43,  with a standard error of 
1.76.18  Neither the U.S.  long-term interest rate nor the credit rationing 
index was at all significant in any of the estimates leading to (7). 
As suggested earlier, the equation for AB is highly sensitive to the ad- 
justments made for the disturbances of the  1963:4-1965:1  period. This 
sensitivity raises doubts about any conclusions that may be drawn from 
(7) except one-the  U.S.  velocity term is significant, with a lag length of 
about a year, in all versions of the equation. As shown in Appendix A, 
when the equation is reestimated on the sample period  1965:4-1969:4, 
the coefficients of the velocity terms become larger and more significant. 
This justifies the inclusion of the velocity sensitivity of AB in the multi- 
plier estimates to be discussed in the next section. The four-quarter  lag in 
changes in U.S.  velocity in equation (7) suggests that it takes a little more 
than a year for long-term banking claims to  complete the stock adjust- 
ment that follows a change in monetary conditions. Thus long-term bank- 
ing claims have the slowest speed of adjustment of the three categories of 
assets that are considered in this paper. 
STOCK  AND  FLOW  MULTIPLIERS  FOR  U.S.  CAPITAL  FLOWS 
The estimated equations for U.S.  financial capital flows-the  nondirect 
investment asset side of the capital account-yield  the stock-shift multi- 
pliers shown in Table 1 for changes of  1 percentage point in the relevant 
interest rates, and for an increase of 0.1 in the credit measure and in U.S. 
velocity.  (The current level  of  velocity  is  about  5,  with  GNP  near  $1 
18. The coefficients  were  estimated  using the Almon technique,  with a second-degree 
polynomial  and a restriction  that the last coefficient  (i =  5 here) take on a zero value. 
Thus two Almon variables  enter the regression  to estimate the four coefficients  shown 
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Table 1.  Stock-Shift Multipliers of U.S. Holdings of Selected Foreign 
Assets Resulting from Increases in Selected Variablesa 
Millions of dollars 
Short-term  Long-term  Long-term 
Increase  private claims  portfolio claims  banking claims 
a n d_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ 
variable  Flowb  Lagc  Flowb  Lagc  Flowb  Lagc 
Mean quarterly  flow,  1960-69  $226  ...  $279  ...  $  27  ... 
Increase of I percentage point in: 
U.S.  short-term rate  -342  3  ...  ...  ... 
U.K.  short-term rate  +252  2  ...  ...  ... 
Eurodollar rate  ...  ...  +249  2  ...  ... 
Canadian long-term  rate  ...  ...  +141  1  ...  ... 
U.K.  long-term  rate  ...  ...  ...  ...  +186  2 
Swiss long-term  rate  ...  ...  ...  ...  +285  2 
Increase of 0.1 in: 
Credit rationing index  ...  ...  -14  1  ...  ... 
U.S. velocity of money  -137  1  -181  1  -191  5 
Sources: Data on short-term private claims-equation  (5); on long-term nondirect, nonbanking claims- 
equation (6); on long-term banking claims-equation  (7). 
a.  The effects are calculated assuming that in 1969:4 total U.S. household net worth equaled $3.02 trillion 
and total U.S. bank assets equaled $431.4 billion. 
b. Plus sign indicates balance-of-payments outflow through increased holdings; minus sign, inflow. 
c.  This is the number of quarters required  for completion of the stock shift after a change in an interest 
rate or velocity. It is the longest lag on the relevant variable in the estimated equation reported in the text. 
trillion and M1 about $200 billion.) The stock-shift multipliers are calcu- 
lated at the 1969:4 values of the wealth or asset scale variables. For AC8 
and AC', the relevant variable is household net worth W, while for AB it 
is total bank assets A. 
To  obtain the stock-shift multiplier of  an interest rate, one multiplies 
the change in i, which is 1.0 by assumption, by the level of the relevant scale 
variable to  obtain WAi, and then multiplies this by the estimated coeffi- 
cient of that i term in the relevant equation. For example, in the equation 
for short-term claims AC8,  the coefficient of the U.S.  short-term rate term 
A(Wi'S)  is  - 113.2.  Thus with  W at  $3.02 trillion, the V  multiplier in 
Table 1 is given by 
-113.2  X 3.02 X  1.0 =-$341.9  million. 
An  increase of  1 percentage point  in  the  U.S.  Treasury bill  rate will 
cause a stock-shift inflow of $342 million in short-term claims over three 
quarters. 252  William H.  Branson 
Similarly, the coefficient of A(WvUs) in equation (5) for AC8  is -454.9, 
so that the vus multiplier for an increase of 0.1 in vu7, is given by 
-454.9  X 3.02 X 0.1 =  -$137.3  million. 
As  noted earlier, the continuing-flow effect (or multiplier) of  a given 
interest rate change is equal to the growth rate of the underlying asset or 
wealth  variable times  the  stock-shift  effect.  With  both  household  net 
worth W and total bank assets A growing at about 7 percent annually in 
recent  years, the  continuing-flow  multipliers would  be  0.07  times  the 
stock-shift multipliers of Table 1. For example, the stock-shift multiplier 
of AiV8  in the AC8  equation is minus $342 million. Thus with W growing 
at 7 percent per year, the continuing-flow effect of a  1 percentage point 
increase in iuY  would be 
-341.9  X 0.07  -$23.9  million per year. 
One important explanatory variable has been left out of the multiplier 
table-U.S.  exports. In equation (5) for AC8,  the coefficient of AXt is 0.18 
and that of AXt-, is 0.39. This says that if the quarterly rate of U.S.  ex- 
ports rises by $100 million, there will be a one-shot outflow of about $60 
million in short-term trade credit over two quarters. 
INTERPRETATIONS  AND  QUALIFICATIONS  OF  THE  RESULTS 
The  empirical estimates reported here are obviously very rough  and 
approximate. The data are quite volatile and there is a natural inclination 
to deal with first differences or flows,  so that an R2 of 0.7 is a welcome 
sight.'9 
But even with these rough estimates, three points emerge clearly. First, 
the problem of capital flows is tractable econometrically. The contention 
that capital movements are too volatile and unpredictable to be dealt with 
econometrically simply won't stand up. There are very strong statistical 
regularities in the data, and they are consistent with traditional portfolio 
theory explanations of what moves capital. 
Second, the estimates presented here and in Appendix A  indicate the 
magnitude of reaction of capital flows on the asset side to be expected when 
19. An R2  of 0.7 won't even get you into the league  in most time-series  cbntests.  This 
gives the capital  movements  game  a standing  a bit like that of soccer  in the United  States. Monetary Policy and the New View of Capital Movements  253 
monetary policy shifts. They are roughly confirmed by estimates by Miller 
and Whitman, who use somewhat different definitions and variables.20 
Third, the econometric results presented here do not  "test" the port- 
folio stock-adjustment  theory in any significant way. Rather, the equations 
are rough estimates of the parameters conditional on the assumption that 
the theory is correct; the theory has been imposed on the data. The fact 
that the results do not violate common sense encourages the view that the 
theory is, in fact, correct. But this is no test of an hypothesis. 
The net result of  these considerations is that,  if international capital 
movements follow the same principles that other capital movements do, 
and especially if they are subject to the theory of portfolio distribution, 
then the present estimates should provide policy makers a reasonable view 
of the international implications of shifts in monetary policy. With this 
reassurance, however dubious, these estimates can now be applied, first, 
to the problem facing monetary policy in the remainder of  1970 and in 
1971, and second, to the question of national monetary independence and 
proposals for improving the processes for adjusting the balance of pay- 
ments. 
Capital Flows with a Shift in Monetary Policy: 
The Outlook for 1970-71 
The estimates of the previous section suggest that a shift to monetary 
ease will cause a fairly large stock-shift increase in  the  capital  account 
deficit, but that after two or three quarters  the continuing-flow effect will be 
fairly small. The simulation of the diferential impact of two assumptions 
concerning money supply growth through 1971:4 shown in Table 2 illus- 
trates this point.2'  The first three columns of Table 2 present the differential 
results for the level of the U.S. velocity measure of two assumptions con- 
cerning monetary growth. In both cases, growth in GNP in current prices 
20. See Miller and Whitman, "Mean-Variance  Analysis," and "The Outflow of 
Short-term  Funds from the United States:  Adjustments  of Stocks  and Flows,"  presented 
at the Universities-NBER  Conference on International  Mobility and Movement of 
Capital,  Brookings  Institution,  Jan. 30-Feb. 1, 1970,  publication  forthcoming. 
21. The Table 2 simulation implicitly assumes that foreign interest rates do not 
respond  to changes  in the U.S. interest  rate  and velocity.  To the extent  that foreign  rates 
do respond,  they would move in the same direction,  making  the change  in differentials 
smaller  than the change  in U.S. values.  Thus the net effect  of the interest  differential  on 
U.S. capital outflow would be smaller  than that reported  in Table 2. 254  William H. Branson 
Table 2.  Effects on U.S.  Capital Flows of Differences in Growth of the 
Money Supply, by Quarter, Third Quarter 1970 to Fourth Quarter 1971 
Dollar  amounts in millions  at quarterly rates 
Effect of dif- 
ferential on 
Velocitya  three-month 
Monetary growth  Treasury  Effects on capital outflows 
Year  assumptions  bill rateb 
and  Differ-  (percentage  Velocity  Bill rate 
quarter  High  Low  ential  points)  differential  differential  Total 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1970  3  4.730  4.798  -0.068  -1.22  $225.2  0  $225.2 
4  4.697  4.833  -0.136  -1.41  259.6  0  259.6 
1971  1  4.697  4.833  -0.136  -0.89  76.8  $438.0  514.8 
2  4.697  4.833  -0.136  -0.89  90.5  77.6  168.1 
3  4.697  4.833  -0.136  -0.89  76.6  -185.0c  -108.4c 
4  4.697  4.833  -0.136  -0.89  38.3  5.0  43.3 
a.  Velocity is defined as GNP/Mi.  Both assumptions about monetary growth set the annual rate of 
growth of GNP at 6 percent in 1970:3-1971:4.  The low assumption puts monetary growth at an annual 
rate of 3 percent in 1970:3-1970:4  and at 6 percent thereafter. The high assumption puts it at 9 percent in 
1970:3-1970:4  and at 6 percent thereafter. 
b.  The changes in the rate on three-month Treasury bills are calculated from the following equation, 
constructed using the total  short- and long-run interest velocities given by Franco Modigliani, Robert 
Rasche, and J. Phillip Cooper, "Central Bank Policy, the Money Supply, and the Short-term Rate of In- 
terest," Journal  of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 2 (May 1970), Table 1, equation (3), p. 171: 
=  10.4 ((s))  -  12.5 (A(w1)) 
cr  J  V-1  t 
c.  Inflow. 
was set at 6 percent (annual rate) from 1970:3 through 1971:4. For a high 
monetary growth rate, I chose 9 percent (annual rate) for 1970:3-1970:4, 
and 6 percent thereafter.  For a low monetary growth assumption, I chose 3 
percent (annual rate) for  1970:3-1970:4,  and 6 percent thereafter. This 
pattern of assumptions permits study of the effects of a one-time change in 
velocity, since the equal 6 percent growth rates of GNP and money supply 
after 1970:4 hold the two velocities constant thereafter. Thus the first two 
columns of Table 2 show the movements in velocity implicit in the high and 
low  assumptions about monetary growth. The third column shows the 
difference in velocity reflecting  the differential impact of the two monetary 
paths. 
Combining a single GNP  path with both the high and low monetary 
paths involves an assumption about the monetary-fiscal policy mix. To 
realize the specified GNP  path with the low monetary path, fiscal policy 
must supply compensatory stimulus. With the high monetary path, fiscal 
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substantially.  Thus the Table 2 simulation  reports  the differential  effect 
of a shift  in the mix of monetary  and  fiscal  policy  that  leaves  the GNP path 
unchanged.  The impact  for capital  flows  of a shift  to monetary  ease would 
be lessened  if a fixed  fiscal  policy  were  assumed  so that  the GNP path  were 
higher  with the higher  monetary  path. 
Table 2 also shows the differential  effect of the alternative  monetary 
paths on the three-month  Treasury  bill rate, using a recent  estimate  of a 
demand-for-money  function  made by Modigliani,  Rasche, and Cooper.22 
The bill rate  is, of course,  lower  for the higher  monetary  path. The differ- 
ence between  the alternative  bill rates  grows  to 1.41 percentage  points in 
1970:4 and then narrows  to 0.89 point as the velocities  remain  constant 
after that quarter.  This movement  reflects  the overshooting  of interest 
rates in response  to changes  in money supply, a usual result in models 
in which  actual money  holdings  are adjusted  to desired  levels  with a lag. 
In the last three  columns  of Table  2 are the differences  in the outflow 
of U.S. financial  capital  that stem from the differences  between  the high 
and low assumptions  about  monetary  growth.23  These  numbers  are in no 
way predictions  of actual  outflows,  but rather  are  estimates  of the differen- 
tial impact  of the high monetary  path compared  with the low path, given 
the assumed  GNP path. 
Column (5) shows the differential  impact  that works directly  through 
velocity.  The outflow  due to the velocity  differential  falls from more  than 
$250 million in 1970:4-an  annual  rate of $1 billion-to  less than $40 
milion in 1971:4. 
Column  (6) records  the estimated  effect  of the bill rate differential.  The 
entire  effect  is on short-term  capital-the only equation  in which  the bill 
rate  is significant.  With  a two-period  lag, the differential  of 1.22  percentage 
points in 1970:3 brings  a $438 million outflow  in 1971:1. Because  the 
differential  then increases  to 1.41  points, a further  outflow  of $78 million 
ensues.  Then as the interest  rate differential  narrows,  an inflow of $185 
million results. Finally, its influence  settles down to a continuing-flow 
effect  of $5 million  per quarter. 
The  total differential  impact  is shown  in the last column  of Table  2. The 
difference  between  the stock-shift  and continuing-flow  effects  is striking. 
22. Franco  Modigliani,  Robert  Rasche, and J. Philip  Cooper, "Central  Bank Policy, 
the Money Supply,  and the Short-term  Rate of Interest,"  Journal  of Money,  Credit  and 
Banking,  Vol. 2 (May 1970),  Table 1, equation  (3), p. 171. 
23. The effect of a change  in the credit  rationing  index cr is not included because  I 
have no ready  way to connect  it to velocity  changes.  In effect,  I assume  cr the same for 
both the high and low monetary  paths. 256  William H. Branson 
For three  quarters  there  is a very  large  stock  shift.  The policy  maker  look- 
ing at the situation  at the end of 1971:1  would  see that an increase  in the 
outflow  of U.S. capital of over $1 billion had occurred  in the previous 
three  quarters  as a result of taking  the high instead  of the low monetary 
path. 
This  kind  of effect,  coupled  with  perhaps  a similar  effect  on the liabilities 
side of the capital account,  might be of major concern  to the monetary 
authority  who worries  about  the balance  of payments.  Indeed  the concern 
might be sufficient  to cause him to regret  choosing the high monetary 
path, but only if he failed to realize  that the phenomenon  was mainly a 
transitory  stock-shift  effect.  By 1971  :4, the differential  effect  on the out- 
flow  would  be down  to a quarterly  rate  of less than  $50 million.  Thus  if the 
stock-shift  outflow  can be handled  by official  financing-that is, by per- 
suading  a foreign  central  bank to hold the dollars-or absorbed  as a re- 
serve  loss, the steady-state  differential  effect  of the shift to monetary  ease 
is small, here perhaps  $200 million a year on the U.S. assets  side of the 
capital  account. 
One  central  point  for monetary  policy  is brought  out by the purely  illus- 
trative  numbers  of Table  2. It is the basic  theme  that has run  through  this 
paper.  When monetary  policy eases and velocity and interest  rates fall, 
there  will be a substantial  capital  outflow  over  two or three  quarters  due  to 
the change  in policy. After this transition,  the continuing  flow owing to 
the change  in policy  will be small.  But events  will be misinterpreted  if the 
monetary  authority  implicitly  holds a flow theory  of capital  movements. 
In that case, as he watches  the large  capital  outflow  in the months  follow- 
ing the easing  of policy,  he will believe  that outflow  will continue,  and at 
least question  the wisdom of the easier  monetary  policy. Thus the flow 
theory could lead to  a substantial  overestimate  of the damage easier 
money  would  do to the balance  of payments,  and could result  in a mone- 
tary  stance  that was overly  restrictive  in terms  of vital  domestic  objectives. 
But if the monetary  authority  takes  the correct  stock-adjustment  view, he 
will realize  that the large  outflow,  while  certainly  worrisome,  is transitory 
and manageable,  and that the longer-run  effects  will be relatively  minor. 
This view would lead to a better-and smaller-estimate of the effect of 
an easier  policy  on the balance  of payments  and thus  put the international 
constraint  on monetary  policy  in its correct-and diminished-role. 
To be sure,  a sufficiently  large  stock-shift  outflow  could  reduce  reserves 
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speculators  knew  the capital  flow was a one-time  shift.  But the shifts  that 
are under  consideration  here seem  reasonably  small  compared  with total 
reserves. 
A final  point  is that  the stock-shift  effects  of changes  in monetary  policy 
are not only large,  but also uncertain.  The estimates  come from  equations 
that, while reasonably  good for this stage of econometric  work in the 
field, still have large standard  errors.  This additional  bit of uncertainty 
with respect  to the effects of monetary  policy reinforces  the point that, 
wherever  possible, monetary  and fiscal policy should be applied  in the 
same direction.24  The support  of fiscal policy will reduce  the magnitude 
of necessary  changes  in monetary  policy, and thus reduce  the size of the 
probable  resulting  stock shift. 
Monetary  Independence  and  Exchange-Rate  Systems 
The previous section pointed out that the stock-adjustment  view of 
capital  flows will give a correct,  and generally  small,  estimate  of the con- 
tinuing  outflow  generated  by an easing  of monetary  policy.  This also im- 
plies that monetary  policy  changes,  within  a reasonable  range  of variation, 
will not have  a major  continuing  effect  on the balance  of payments  in a full 
employment  economy.  From one point of view,  this is bad: It reduces  the 
number  of effective  policy instruments  for balance-of-payments  adjust- 
ment.  But  from  another  point  of view,  this  is good: It frees  monetary  policy 
to serve  domestic  objectives.  If monetary  policy  will have only small  con- 
tinuing  effects  on capital  flows, then its stance  can be determined  mainly 
with reference  to the domestic  situation. 
The gradual  drift of the capital  account  balance,  generated  by growing 
portfolios  in a world of domestically  focused  monetary  policies,  could be 
compensated  for by a gradual  change  in exchange  rates that adjusts  the 
current account to  balance the capital account. One major argument 
against  such  a "crawling  peg"  system  has been  that it will impose  an addi- 
tional  interest  rate constraint  on monetary  volicv.25 It is argued  on a flow 
24. The role of uncertainty  is studied  in William  C. Brainard,  "Uncertainty  and the 
Effectiveness  of Policy,"  in American  Economic  Association,  Papers  and  Proceedings  of 
the  Seventy-ninth  Annual  Meeting,  1966  (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 57, May 1967), 
pp. 411-25. 
25. This point is discussed  at more length in Branson  and Willett, "Policy Toward 
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theory  basis  that a downward  drift  in an established  equilibrium  exchange 
rate will generate  a continuing  capital  outflow,  requiring  the depreciating 
country  to maintain  its interest  rates above those abroad  by an amount 
equal  to the rate of change  of the exchange  rate. 
But in the stock-adjustment  model, with expected  rates of change  of 
exchange  rates  playing  a role analogous  to that of interest  rates,  the shift 
from an expected  rate of change  of zero to some negative  value  will bring 
a stock-shift  outflow.  When  the rate stabilizes  at a lower  level and the ex- 
pected  rate of change  returns  to zero, there  will be an equal  and opposite 
stock-shift  inflow. Thus if official  financing  (so-called  recycling)  of these 
transitory  shifts  can be arranged,  there  is no need for interest  rates  to be 
adjusted  to compensate  for the crawl  of the exchange  rate. 
This strengthens  the view that exchange  rates  should  be adjusted  grad- 
ually  through  some kind of crawling  peg system  to provide  changes  in the 
current  account  that compensate  for movements  in the capital account. 
In this case, monetary  policy can be partially  freed  from the balance-of- 
payments  constraint  and used with an eye more toward  domestic  needs. 
APPENDIX  A 
Estimation  of U.S. Financial 
Capital  Flows1 
Short-term  Claims 
Equation (5) above is the final form of the equation for short-term 
claims (AC8)  estimated over the period 1960:1-1968:4  (excluding 1963:3). 
Seasonal  variation  was found to be significant  and dummy  variables  for 
each quarter  of the year  were  estimated.  The values  (and the correspond- 
ing t statistics) were:  -  125.6 (1.55) for the first quarter; -  122.0 (1.50) 
for the second  quarter;  and -356.2  (4.23)  for the third  quarter. 
In addition  to those variables  retained,  a number  of others  were  tried. 
1. The appendixes  were prepared  by Raymond D. Hill. Monetary Policy and the New View of Capital Movements  259 
The coefficient of the Eurodollar rate was insignificant and had the wrong 
sign in earlier versions. The coefficient of the Canadian Treasury bill rate 
was  larger than its  standard error over the  period  1960:1-1964:4,  but 
was less significant over the longer sample. Canadian, United Kingdom, 
and a weighted average of European velocities failed to be significant. 
When data for  1969:1-1969:4  are included in the sample period, the 
resulting equation is: 
(A.1)  AQC  =  508.9 +  5667.0AWt  +  0.19AXt  +  0.12AXt-l 
(6.01)  (2.83)  (2.06)  (1.28) 
+  51.2A(WiVK)t +  28.5A(WiuK)t-1 -  87.6A(WiFs)t-2 
(1.97)  (1.06)  (1.80) 
-  1162.7A(WvUs)t  -  468.0 DStockl  -  80.5 DFlowl. 
(2.19)  (3.33)  (1.01) 
Seasonal  dummies:  Q1 =-199.2,  Q2  --162.6,  Q3  =-419.6. 
(1.96)  (1.57)  (3.91) 
R2 = 0.72, standard  error = 200.9, Durbin-Watson  =  2.39. 
The results in equation (A.1) are similar to  those in (5) except that the 
sum and significance of the coefficients of the two  export variables are 
greatly reduced. This is due apparently to the disturbance in the timing 
relationship between claims and exports created by a dock strike in early 
1969, which caused a deep cut in exports in 1969: 1 and a sharp rise in the 
next quarter. 
Equation (A.2) attempts to account for the dock strike in 1969. 
(A.2)  ACt =  441.9 +  5140.0AWt  +  0.18AXt +  0.44A2Xt2  +  62.9A(WiuK)t 
(5.98)  (3.09)  (1.81)  (4.06)  (3.00) 
+  34.8A(WiVK)t1  -  101.8A(Wius)t-2-  999.7A(Wvus)t 
(1.55)  (2.53)  (2.33) 
-514.0  DStockl  -  109.2  DFlowl. 
(4.38)  (1.63) 
Seasonal dummies: Q1  =-155.1,  Q2  =-102.1,  Q3 =-425.8. 
(1.80)  (1.18)  (4.82) 
R2 = 0.80, standard  error =  169.5, Durbin-Watson  = 2.43. 
The export series was smoothed out by replacing the value for 1969: 1 with 
the actual value for 1968:4 plus the average quarterly increase in exports 
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1968:4 plus twice the average  increase.  As a result of this operation  the 
coefficients  of the export variables  are restored  approximately  to their 
former  size and level of significance. 
In both (A.  1) and  (A.2) the coefficient  of U.S. velocity  rises  substantially 
in size and significance.  This increase  reinforces  the case in favor of in- 
cluding  U.S. velocity  in equation  (5), where  it is a marginally  significant 
variable. 
Long-term  Portfolio  Claims 
Equation  (6) of the text is the final  form of the equation  for long-term 
portfolio  claims AOC  estimated  over the period 1960:1-1969:4.  The esti- 
mated  seasonal  dummy  variables  were: 
Q=  -3.0,  Q2  =-53.5,  Q3  =-112.4. 
(0.05)  (0.95)  (2.02) 
The U.S., U.K., Swiss,  and German  long-term  bond rates  were  also tried, 
as well as the U.S., U.K., and Canadian  short-term  rates.  None of these 
rates was significant,  and the coefficients  of most had the wrong signs. 
The U.K., Canadian,  and a weighted  average  of European  velocities  were 
also tried  without  success. 
Contrary  to what one might  expect,  U.S. velocity  and the credit  ration- 
ing variable  appear  to act independently  of one another.  Leaving  one of 
the two out of the equation  has very  little  effect  on the size and  significance 
of the coefficient  of the other. 
Long-term  Banking  Claims 
Equation  (7) above  is the final  form  of the equation  for long-term  bank- 
ing claims AB estimated  over the period 1960:1-1969:4.  No significant 
seasonal  pattern  was found. 
Other  interest  rates tried were the Canadian  long-term  rate, the U.S. 
short and long rates, and the Eurodollar  rate. Foreign  velocities  and the 
credit  rationing  variable  were  also tried. 
The size and significance  of the coefficients  of (7) were  extreniely  sensi- 
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equation for long-term banking claims was estimated on data from 1965:4 
to 1969:4 in order to avoid the disturbances of the programs. U.S. velocity 
continued to play the most important role in this new set of equations, 
of which (A.3) is the "best." 
(A.3)  AB =  219.7 +  0.15A(AiUK)t  +  0.12A(Ai D)t +  1.35A(AvUK)t 
(2.23)  (1.16)  (2.03)  (1.85) 
5 
+  E  wA(AvUs)t_. 
i=o 
R2 = 0.63, standard  error =  53.1, Durbin-Watson  =  2.74. 
The coefficients  of (AvUs)t-i  are: 
Laglength  0  1  2  3  4  5 
Coefficients  -0.24  -1.61  -2.27  -2.22  -1.46  0.0 
(0.47)  (3.12)  (3.51)  (3.52)  (3.49) 
2wj  =  -7.79,  standard  error  of sum = 2.32. 
APPENDIX  B 
Symbols  and Sources  of Data 
Used in Regressions 
AC' =  change in U.S. short-term claims on foreigners, in millions of dol- 
lars at quarterly rates, from David T. Devlin,  "The U.S.  Balance 
of  Payments: First  Quarter 1970," Survey of  Current Business, 
Vol. 50 (June 1970), Table 1, lines 38 and 40, pp. 36 ff. 
AC' =  change in U.S. long-term nonbanking, nondirect investment claims 
on foreigners, in millions of dollars at quarterly rates, from ibid., 
lines 34, 35, 36, and 39. 
AB =  change in long-term banking claims on foreigners, in millions of 
dollars at quarterly rates, from ibid., line 37. 
W =  U.S. household net worth, in trillions of dollars, from unpublished 
data from the Federal Reserve Board-MIT econometric model; 
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A =  total bank assets, in billions of dollars, from unpublished flow of 
funds data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System; available from the author. 
iUS  =  rate on three-month U.S. Treasury bills, in percent, from Organi- 
sation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD), 
Main Economic Indicators, relevant issues. 
iVK =  rate on 91-day U.K.  Treasury bills, in percent, from ibid. 
iED  =  rate on three-month Eurodollar deposits in London,  in percent, 
from Bank of England Quarterly  Bulletin, relevant issues. 
iCAN =  rate on long-term Canadian government bonds, in percent, from 
OECD, Main Economic Indicators,  relevant issues. 
iSw =  rate on long-term Swiss government bonds, in percent, from Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics, relevant 
issues. 
*UK  =raeo  rate on long-term U.K. government  bonds, in percent, from OECD, 
Main Economic Indicators, relevant issues. 
v =  income velocity of money, defined as the ratio of  gross national 
product to M1, demand deposits plus currency; both GNP (at an- 
nual  rates)  and  M1 in  billions  of  dollars,  seasonally  adjusted; 
GNP  and M1 from OECD,  Main Economic Indicators, relevant 
issues. 
cr =  credit  rationing  measure, from  Dwight  M.  Jaffee and  Franco 
Modigliani, "A Theory and Test of Credit Rationing," American 
Economic Review, Vol. 59 (December 1969), pp. 850-72. 
X =  U.S. merchandise exports, in millions of dollars at quarterly rates, 
from Devlin, "U.S. Balance of Payments," Table 1, line 3. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Lawrence Krause: I  am fundamentally sympathetic with  Branson's ap- 
proach, and I share his view that the difference between portfolio adjust- 
ment and flow  adjustment is a major one. The difference seems simple 
enough-perhaps  it may even strike some as old hat. But it is not fully 
understood and it remains relevant. Let me offer an example out of the 
newly released 1970 Annual Report of the International Monetary Fund. 
Referring to the U.S. balance of payments, it said: "In view of the sizable 
deficit in (basic) transactions, it is necessary for the monetary authorities to 
pay particular  attention to the implications of domestic credit policy for the 
level of U.S.  short-term interest rates in relation to those abroad." 
That statement takes a flow view of the implications of interest rates 
for the balance of payments. It also seems to focus attention on rate dif- 
ferentials. This implies that, if there were a parallel shift of U.S. and foreign 
interest rates, nothing would happen. But Branson's illustrative numbers 
of Table 1 show that net flows would take place even with a parallel shift. 
Finally,  the  statement  underlines the  deficit  on  basic  transactions-a 
concept that has less and less meaning for the United States. 
Branson argues and works to demonstrate that the econometric prob- 
lems of the portfolio  adjustment approach are tractable. I  agree, but I 
would like to point out some of the problems. The data are very poor, in- 
volving gaps and errors of measurement. Moreover, institutional peculiari- 
ties distort the flows, and special factors can have a large and erratic impact 
from time to  time.  For  these reasons, the specification of  relationships 
becomes very important, perhaps the most crucial part of the work. And I 
do have problems with some of the specified relationships in the paper. 
First, I would note the omission of any risk variable. One of the essential 
ingredients in a portfolio shift between foreign and domestic assets is the 
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difference in risk. Exchange rates introduce a  special risk into  interna- 
tional finance. To an American choosing foreign assets, this may not be 
very important because he can acquire them denominated in U.S. dollars. 
The exchange risk is assumed by the borrower. But this risk must be intro- 
duced in an analysis of U.S.  liabilities because these reflect the portfolio 
choices of foreigners. The whole liability side remains a missing element of 
Branson's work. 
This paper illustrates the usual plight of the specialist in international 
economics. Often, more exact theory is needed to determine the interna- 
tional implications of events and policies than is needed in domestic eco- 
nomics. For  example, the question constantly arises of whether, and to 
what extent, a shift from a corporate income tax to  a value-added tax 
would  help the  balance of  payments. The international experts cannot 
answer that question because the theory of incidence is not refined enough. 
The public finance experts have not  supplied the domestic information 
needed to answer the international questions. 
In the present case of monetary problems, it may well be good enough 
to  have  a little black box  that generates domestic results when certain 
monetary conditions are changed. But one would like a better understand- 
ing of the international consequences. How does a velocity change influ- 
ence the choice between domestic and foreign assets? It is not enough that 
the variable works econometrically. The multipliers suggest that there is 
some shift from long-term to short-term assets as a result of higher veloc- 
ity. That may make sense, but only within a theoretical framework that 
explains what velocity and credit rationing mean. Otherwise, one has to 
grope for explanations. That's what Branson seems to be doing when he 
puts the foreigner at the back of the credit line. Some foreign bankers re- 
port that when there is tight money and credit rationing in the United 
States, large American firms get to the front of their line. As one banker 
put it, when DuPont  knocks  on  your door, you  don't turn him  away. 
That may be equally true on the American side. If British Petroleum knocks 
on the U.S. banker's door, I don't think it is turned away either. 
I  am  troubled by  the  specification for  equation  (5)-for  short-term 
claims.  There is  a  special dummy variable dealing with  the  voluntary 
foreign credit restraint program. I submit that no one who had not looked 
at the data would have specified the equation in this particular way. The 
program placed a ceiling on how much banks could lend abroad and that 
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ceiling. That is not explainable in terms of profit maximization. Branson's 
explanation is that banks wanted to operate without worrying about the 
ceiling. But they are used to working subject to reserve requirements, and 
there is a secondary market for reserves. The explanation really isn't very 
adequate. 
The absence of the U.S.  bond rate in the equation for long-term port- 
folio  claims is also disturbing. The theory insists that the bond rate be- 
longs there to  represent the alternative U.S.  asset. I know it is omitted 
because it does not work empirically. Maybe some other variables that 
appear are picking up the influence of the U.S.  bond rate. This may be 
particularly true of the Eurodollar rate. That rate is supposed to  reflect 
the demand for, and the supply of, dollars in Europe. When there is a gap 
between Regulation  Q  ceilings and money  market rates in  the  United 
States, the Eurodollar rate also reflects U.S.  excess demand for dollars 
coming  from  Europe,  and  thus  U.S.  rather than  European monetary 
conditions. So it may at times be a proxy for the U.S. bond rate. 
Another  troublesome element in  the  long-term portfolio  equation  is 
the dummy for the interest equalization tax. When properly scaled, the 
tax  should  be  usable  as  an  explanatory variable in  some  continuous 
form-not  merely as a dummy. In addition, since the Canadians are ex- 
empted, it  would  theoretically be  preferable to  have data  separate for 
those countries subject to the tax and those exempted. 
Long-term banking claims provide the  classic example of  the  major 
special factors on the international side. Before 1963 it was the most pre- 
dictable item in the balance of payments because it was a specialized busi- 
ness. Term loans by banks to foreigners were a very complicated, unre- 
warding kind of business so they were not  used much. Before  1963, to 
forecast it,  all one had to know was the delivery of ships to Norwegian 
shipowners because that was all that term loans financed. Then the interest 
equalization tax placed a 15 percent tax on long-term capital flows of secu- 
rities but no tax on bank loans. It suddenly became very profitable to ex- 
pand term loans.  The whole concept changed. It was no  longer in the 
same ball park. Quarterly flows went from $50 million to  $500 million. 
That may still seem a small number to GNP  experts but it is big in the 
balance of payments. 
For all my criticism, I think the illustrative examples do teach Branson's 
lesson-to  stay calm  about  capital flows  when monetary policy  shifts. 
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may even be offered here for domestic monetary managers. If a certain 
amount of liquidity is injected into the domestic economy, some of that is 
going to leak abroad in the early quarters. Hence, the domestic impact will 
be held down initially. More mileage may be gotten out of the same injec- 
tion of fuel subsequently, because there will be less leakage abroad. 
John Kareken: Branson finds both comforting and discomforting implica- 
tions of the new view. I basically agree with his verdict, but I'd like to 
elaborate and amend it on both sides. First, he finds it discomforting be- 
cause monetary policy no longer offers a handle on international adjust- 
ments. That loss of an instrument applies for long-term, steady-state policy 
solutions. But the new view does not foreclose the use of monetary policy to 
finance temporarily some disturbance by raising or lowering interest rates 
successively over a few years. Monetary policy remains a way of dealing 
with temporary international adjustment problems. 
On the other hand, Branson finds it comforting that monetary policy is 
more or less freed from the balance-of-payments constraint and can be 
determined largely by domestic considerations. That may or may not be 
right depending on the initial stock of reserves and the nation's consequent 
ability to  accept a sizable one-shot loss. It is easy to  imagine a country 
that goes bankrupt by easing monetary policy. I could even forgive some- 
one who felt a bit nervous about a 10 percent loss of U.S. reserves. Even 
when the change in policy is a rather modest one, something may have 
to  be  added for loss  due to  speculation, particularly in the case of the 
United States if the distribution of demand between gold and dollars is at 
all affected. I can conceive of people understanding  fully the stock-adjust- 
ment view of the world but estimating the probability of a parity change 
on the basis of the stock of reserves. That could cause some trouble in the 
short run. 
Branson's simulations focus on an easing of monetary policy that repre- 
sents a shift in the fiscal-monetary mix with no net impact on aggregate 
demand. Of course, monetary policy may also be used as a net stimulus to 
raise GNP. In that event it is clear that the capital outflow is going to be 
less than in the case of the same monetary easing to  shift the mix. But 
then effects on the current account may become significant with the change 
in GNP. 
The empirical work proceeds as though interest rates in the rest of the 
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This does not seem to square with complaints we heard from Europeans 
when the Regulation Q ceiling was operative. 
Other findings also raise suspicions that the equations may not  have 
captured the real world. For example, the credit rationing variable appears 
significant only in the long-term portfolio equation and that is the one 
equation  that  does  not directly  reflect  decisions  by banks.  I am  not sur- 
prised that it is significant in that equation. If the nonbanking sector is 
rationed in its demand for bank loans, it can help finance itself in effect by 
buying fewer claims from foreigners. But I cannot explain why the variable 
is not significant in the other two equations. Also, a bewildering array of 
interest rates shows up in the equations. Perhaps it would have been more 
straightforward to  take a weighted average of foreign interest rates and 
do or die with that variable. 
I would be happier if I understood the role velocity is intended to play 
in the analysis. If it is meant to serve as a proxy for credit rationing, then 
I doubt that foreign velocity belongs in the specification. Since the data 
reject the inclusion of foreign velocity, this should be a welcome view. It 
probably ought not to be specified. When Europeans are being rationed 
out of their banks, the supply of claims offered to lenders will be affected, 
but the U.S.  demand for claims will not be altered. If these are demand 
equations, the velocities can be interpreted as proxies for interest rates. 
Since there is an abundance of interest rate series, I do not know why a 
proxy should be needed. 
Walter Salant:  Branson makes the point that the stock-adjustment view 
of capital flows weakens one important objection to the "crawling peg" 
system of exchange rates. I think that a proponent of fixed rates could find 
reasons why this new view also makes flexibility of  exchange rates less 
necessary. One reason it is thought necessary is that the fixed-rate system 
inhibits the freedom to use monetary policy. If capital flows reflect stock 
adjustments, central bankers ought to feel they have more freedom than 
they previously thought they had. If, for example, they want to  tighten 
money to restrict domestic demand, they need not be so inhibited by the 
danger of  attracting foreign funds, because they will recognize that the 
inflow of those funds will be temporary. 
One might argue, in response, that a temporary inflow is sufficient to 
offset a restrictive policy, since monetary policy affects demand by operat- 
ing on the stock of money or liquid assets. This response raises another 268  William H. Branson 
question: whether domestic demand is  affected by the  proportion of  a 
given money stock (or given stock of liquid assets) that is owned by for- 
eigners. Suppose the effects on total demand depend not on the total sup- 
ply of domestic money but only, or mainly, on the domestically owned 
portion of it. Then the effect of an increase in interest rates would not be 
fully, and maybe only slightly, offset by an equal increase in foreign-owned 
money. The question of whether domestic demand is affected by who owns 
the money supply, and of how that ownership is affected by changes in 
interest rates, may seem unimportant because foreign ownership of the 
U.S. money supply is so small. But that isn't the case for other countries. 
William Branson: On  the  interpretation of  velocity-it  may  be  supple- 
menting interest rates in measuring the opportunity cost of lending abroad. 
If domestic money markets tighten, velocity goes up; the opportunity cost 
of lending to foreigners also goes up. Presumably the velocity increase is 
picking up some kind of extra return on lending at home that may not be 
caught in  any  of  the  interest rate series, since credit markets are not 
perfect. 
The best way to handle the interest equalization tax would be to adjust 
foreign interest rates for its effect. The tax was meant to create a wedge 
between gross and net foreign interest rates as they appear to U.S. potential 
lenders. I am planning to make that adjustment  if I can find the appropriate 
interest rates to adjust. In their absence, something else had to be done in 
this paper. 
I agree with John Kareken that under the new view, monetary policy 
can still be used to finance temporary,  reversible  perturbations  in the United 
States balance of payments. If something temporarily  happened to the cur- 
rent account, then it might be useful to raise interest rates for a while. But I 
am concerned lest U.S. interest rates might be pushed not just temporarily 
higher but,  rather, permanently higher,  because  of  anxiety  about  the 
balance of payments. 
General Discussion 
While most of the participants in the discussion expressed their support 
for the stock-adjustment approach, important reservations were noted by 
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accepted the basic logic of this kind of stock approach to portfolios, but 
stressed that the speed of that stock adjustment and the factors influencing 
that speed are of great importance. The rapidity of the stock adjustment 
implied by Branson's results seemed too  good to be completely credible. 
Duesenberry cited findings on domestic portfolio  adjustments that indi- 
cated they may be spread over a period of several years. Especially for 
assets with long maturities, a large proportion is effectively locked in by 
the heavy transaction costs involved in portfolio shifting. The old stock is 
only gradually adjusted to its new equilibrium proportions. On the other 
hand, increases in assets can be handled much more flexibly. 
Duesenberry argued that such a slow process would look,  in practice, 
very much like a flow adjustment to anybody who is worrying about the 
balance of payments. The basic logic would be a portfolio stock adjust- 
ment, but the current flow variables would be governing the speed of ad- 
justment. Duesenberry also suggested that the advent of convertibility in 
1958 presented one case of  a very large change in international returns 
and risks. If people had reacted to that change with the speed estimated 
in the Branson paper, there would have been an enormous outflow in a 
very short period of time. 
William Poole reported on his own experience analyzing Canadian capi- 
tal flows. He had found the empirical results distressingly sensitive to the 
sample period chosen. Although he preferred  the stock-adjustment  formu- 
lation on theoretical grounds, the flow formulation had yielded somewhat 
superior empirical results. 
Poole  stated his judgment that errors in the measurement of  capital 
flows tend to bias the coefficients for speed of adjustment in the direction 
of indicating a faster shift than really occurs. Similarly, he felt that the 
difficulty of measuring the appropriate interest rate biases downward esti- 
mates of the interest elasticity. Both of these biases make the estimated 
effects of changes in interest rates inappropriately small. 
William Brainard commented that  the  stock-adjustment view  of  the 
world was not reassuring if the desired proportions of portfolios change 
very substantially in response to  small changes in yields.  What makes 
Branson's results reassuring is their implication that long-run changes in 
proportions are quite small-that  international assets are not very interest 
sensitive. But  these  results might  signify merely that  Branson's rather 
special specification is not adequate for capturing the lagged adjustments 
that continue after the initial few quarters. 270  William H. Branson 
Branson replied by noting that long lags of adjustment following interest 
rate changes are implied by the opposing view and they just do not show up 
in the data. He also suggested that, because there may have been a long 
reaction to the change to convertibility in 1958, one should not infer that 
people have long reaction times to changes in interest rates. The advent of 
convertibility was a major structural change; it is not a happy analogy to 
interest rate changes. People in these markets are continually watching 
interest rates, and they have every incentive to translate yield differentials 
into prompt portfolio action. 